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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The division of property belonging to the

parties was proper inasmuch as the trial court must consider each case on its own facts, and achieve equity, may
exercise wide latitude in awarding relief as it deems
just and proper.
2.

The court below properly awarded the Appellant

the value of his labors consistent with evidence presented
at trial.

The conduct and testimony of the parties demon-

strates that no gift was intended and that each party considered himself owner of his separate property.
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a divorce action where the sole issue is
the equitable distribution of property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the court Judge Robert F.
Owens, District Judge pro tern and a Circuit Judge of the
State of Utah Presiding.
RELIEF SOUGHT
That Defendant-Appellant, William LeRoy Jesperson,
Sr. be denied any modification whatsoever of the division

1

o:

property made by the court below consistent with the evidencl

1

I

presented to the lower court and the points presented in
this response to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff-Respondent and the Defendant-Appella:
were married to each other on March 20, 1973 in Roswell, Ne·•.·
Mexico, and no children were born as issue to the marriage
(Tr. Pl4, LL12-18).

Plaintiff is now 74 years old and Defen·

dant is now 79 years old.

(Full Disclosure Financial

Declarations).
At the time of the marriage the Defendant-Appella"'.
had no assets having been unemployed for some five years
prior thereto with monthly social security as his sole sourc:
of income (Tr. P201, LL4-25, LLl-6).

Plaintiff-Respondent
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did own property consisting of an automobile, furniture,
$12,500.00 in certificates of deposit, $10,000.00 in savings,

(Tr. P38, LL4-9), and a mobile home which had been

recently purchased for $17,500.

(Tr. P38, LL4-9).

On March 1, 1979 a trial was held pursuant to the
Plaintiff-Respondent's action for divorce at which time the
court distributed the property of the marriage 77% to the
Plaintiff and 23% to the Defendant.
1979).

(FINDINGS P.2, March 2,

The court also made the following findings:
1.

joint tenancy,

Although the mobile home in issue is held in
there was no intention by Plaintiff to create

a one-half property interest in Defendant, nor any expectation by Defendant that he had received a one-half property
interest.
2.

Defendant was guilty of repeated marital mis-

conduct which not only constitutes grounds for divorce, but
which should be considered in making an equitable division
of property.
3.

The purchase price of the mobile home and lot

in issue was $19,027.00 which was all contributed from
Plaintiff's separate funds, and which she is entitled to
recover from the $27,000.00 sales price, leaving a balance
of $7,973.00 to be disposed of.

(FINDINGS, Pl, March 2, 1979)

The Plaintiff-Respondent does not agree with and
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takes exception to the Defendant-Appellant's statement of
facts inconsistent with the statement herein contained for
the reason that the Defendant-Appellant's statement of
facts is in essence argument and not a concise statement of
the facts as required by Rule 75 (p)

-4-

(2)

(2)

(d).
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ARGUMENT
Point 1.

The division of property belonging to the parties
was proper inasmuch as the trial court must consider each case on its own facts, and to achieve
equity, may exercise wide latitude as it deems
just and proper.
In testimony presented at trial it was established

that the marriage of the parties was perilously "on the rocks"
almost from its very beginning.

Some three weeks subsequent

to the marriage ceremony the Defendant-Appellant abandoned
his new wife while they were on vacation in Phoenix, Arizona
(they were residing in Ruidoso, New Mexico at the time)
leaving only a note stating that he was going to go away with
Edith, another woman.

(Tr. Pl4, LL24, 25, Tr. Pl5, LLl-20).

This first extended absence lasted for a period of Twenty-one
days (Tr. Pl5, LL20-23).

In the five years that followed,

the Defendant-Appellant made excursions to distant parts of
the country from Florida (Tr. Pl5, LL12-15) to California
(Tr. P33 LLll-12) on eleven different occassions, some lasting
as long as three months (Tr. P29, LL14-23).

In total, the

Defendant-Appellant was absent from his wife over three hundred days.

(Tr. Pl4, LL3-9).
As presented in the statement of facts, the Plaintiff-

Respondent came into the marriage with at least $22,500.00 in

-5-
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savings and certificates of deposit (Tr. P39, LL19-2S),
a home and an automobile fully paid for (Tr. P40, LL7-ll)
The Defendant-Appellant, on the other hand,
into the marriage with nothing more than the right to receive a social security check in an amount of less th~
$240. 00 (Tr. Pl98, 116, 7), an old suitcase with a rope ti~c
around it, and a duff le bag containing a few old clothes.
(Tr. P41, 1112-25, P42, 111-24).
At the end of the marriage, Plaintiff-Respondent':
savings and certificates of deposit had been completely depleted, a large portion thereof having been spent on keepir.;
the household and providing the expenses of improvement of
the same (Tr. P62, 119-25), sending money to the DefendantAppellant at his request in exchange for his continual
promises to return from his visits to other women, and giving the Defendant-Appellant money at his request to sustain
his expensive gambling habit in Las yegas (Tr .. P60, L19-25,
Tr. P51, 111-25, Tr. P74, 114-23).

The only items of prop-

erty remaining were the mobile home, the furniture therein
and the automobile, all of which had also been purchased
with Plaintiff-Respondent's separate funds (Tr. P38, 114· 9,
1120-25).

In essence, the Plaintiff-Respondent entered

this marriage well situated, with enough income to take
care of herself likely for the remainder of her life.
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Ho1.·

ever in a few short years she went out of the marriage having
lost a substantial portion of her assets, and the DefendantAppellant having received substantial benefits therefrom.
The Defendant-Appellant then comes before the court, contests
the property distribution, and attempts to gain one-half of
the rest of the Plaintiff-Respondent's assets as a result of
his having helped around the yard on the three homes in which
the couple lived.
The lower court, after hearing the evidence, found
no basis for assisting the Defendant-Appellant in his further
usurpation of the Plaintiff-Respondent's property, but rendered a just and equitable award consistent with the facts of
the case.
The lower court's consideration of the DefendantAppellant's repeated marital misconduct in making an equitable
division of the property was consistent with the rule first
enunciated in Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah 2nd 79,_ 296 P. 2d 977

(1956):
"In regard to the defendant's contention that the
judgment represents an effort of the court to
impose a punishment upon him:
We recognize that
there is no authority in our law for administering
punitive measures in a divorce judgment, and that
to do so would be improper, except that the court
may, and as a practical matter invariably does,
consider the relative lo alt or dislo alt of the
parties to t eir marriage vows, an t eir re ative
uilt or innocence in causin the breaku of the
marriage.
It is to be recognize that it is
seldom, perhaps never, that there is any wholly

-7-
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guilty or wholly innocent party to a divorce
action.
The trial court was aware, of course
that when people are well adjusted and happy'.
·
·
marriage,
one o f t h em d oes not Just
out of a in
clear blue sky fall in love with someone else·
and that when this occurs it is usually an ind.
1
cation that the marriage has disintegrated fro
other causes."
(Emphasis ours)
m
From the facts presented at trial, the DefendancAppellant' s disregard for the marriage vows was so flagrant
that at one point he left the Plaintiff-Respondent for a
period of three months, moved into an apartment with the
girlfriend Edith only to return when he ran out of money
(Tr. P29, LL3-25, P30, LLl-8).

He stated

at the trial the:

his· reason for leaving the Plaintiff-Respondent only three
weeks after their marriage was because of his adrnit'ted love
for another woman (Tr. Pl58, LLl-8).
The trial court in its findings did

not state thi:·

it was administering any punitive measures against the Defe:.c
Appellant, but only that marital misconduct was taken into·
sideration in making an equitable property se.ttlernent. Tha'.
particular finding,

taken together with other facts replete

in the record such as;

(a)

that only the Plaintiff-Responc:

brought substantial property into the marriage, property ac;:
ulated and paid for prior to the Defendant-Appellant' 5 arri
upon the scene;

(b)

,,

that little or no property was accur:i•;.

during the marriage with the exception of appreciation

°f t:'

real property which had been bought and paid for by Plaine
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Respondent;

(c)

that the ability of either party to earn

money was limited, inasmuch as both parties were over the
age of retirement;

(d)

that the financial condition of

the Plaintiff-Respondent was secure whereas the DefendantAppellant had only Social Security as a source;

(e)

that

the duration of the marriage was less than six years, no
children having been born, and the Defendant-Appellant having been absent a great deal of the time; (f) that the
Plaintiff-Respondent, by way of this marriage had to give
up her substantial security and share it with the DefendantAppellant through the duration of the marriage; (g) that
the Defendant-Appellant exerted pressures upon the PlaintiffRespondent to provide for him and place some of her property
in joint tenancy (Tr. Pll5, LL8-23) all lend support to the
logic of the lower court's distribution of the property.
In light of all the facts the trial court clearly
followed the guidance provided in the recent _case of Read v.
Read 594 P. 2d 871, Utah (1979) wherein it stated:
"When a marriage has failed, a court's duty
is to consider the various factors relating
to the situation and to arrange the best
possible allocation of the property and the
economic resources of the parties so that
parties and their children can pursue their
lives in as happy and useful manner as possible."
(emphasis ours)
The trial court distributed the property 77% to the PlaintiffRespondent and 23% to the Defendant-Appellant.

Each party
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after the separation returned to live with a relative·, t he
Plaintiff-Respondent in Texas, and the Defendant-Appell ant
in California.

The Defendant-Appellant was at least, froc

a financial standpoint, returned to a position where, as
he admitted at trial, was no worse off than he was prior
to the marriage.

(Tr. P200, LL9-25).

The Plaintiff-

Respondent however suffere4 irreparable financial loss as,
result of the entanglement and was not, and apparently
could not be, returned to her pre-marriage financial condition.
It would appear that the trial court was very
cautious to properly apply the rule of Read v. Read Supra.
However the court was apparently also aware that the same
rule of law applied to a new set of facts may result in a
different outcome.

In Read the court dealt with the breaku~'

of a twenty-five year marriage which included four children.
(one still living at home), five automobiles •. a family
business having been jointly managed by the parties for
some eighteen years, and various other real and personal
property possessions.

The fruits of the marriage in ~

were apparently born out of many years of joint toil a~
effort.

In the present case there were no children, only a

·
1 y deci· ded that absent
short marriage, and the court o b vious
· encrd
the facts of Read, the Defendant-Appellant had expen a "pursuit of his life in as happy and as useful manner
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as possible" at the expense of the Plaintiff-Respondent for
five years of marriage and that by this action he should
not be permitted to continue such a course.
The Defendant-Appellant presents the case of
Martinett v. Martinett 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P2d 821 (1958),
in support of its position.

Once again, as in Read, Supra

the fundamental rule is correct, that the trial court must
consider the various factors relating to the situation and
not abuse its discretion, however the facts of the case
are entirely different.

In Martinett the parties had as

the opinion states; "spent substantially their adult lives
together."

They had raised two children and had accumulated

significant property over the course of thirty-three years
of marriage.

The court found itself in the position of hav-

ing to untie the complicated knot of thirty-three years of
property accumulation, contributions by the parties, and the
degrees of reliance of one party upon

anothe~

over the years.

These facts are hardly similar to those of the case now before the court.
The Plaintiff-Appellant strongly emphasizes that
given the facts of the current case, and given the law of
the above stated cases, the trial court would have been
clearly abusing its discretion if it had attempted to treat
the brief, uncertain, and loose arrangement between the
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P arties in this case in the same fashion as the law require
a marriage to be treated when being dissolved after long
years of interwoven interests and untraceable accumulations
of property.

The trial court applied the proper law to the

proper facts and in so doing was well within the bounds of
the underlying test in this matter before the court, first
laid down in Wilson Supra.

and reiterated in Martinett as

follows:
''Nevertheless, it is firmly established in
our law that the trial judge will be indulged
considerable latitude and discretion in
ad ·us tin the financial and ro ert interests
of the parties; conversely however, i there
is such serious inequity as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion, this court will
make the modification necessary to bring
about a just result."
(emphasis ours)
The Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully submits that a just
result has been reached and that the trial court was proper
exhibiting no serious inequity or abuse of discretion in
making its award in this case.
Point 2.

The court below properly awarded the Defendant·
Appellant the value of his labors consistent
with evidence presented at trial.

The conduct

and testimony of the parties demonstrated that
no gift was intended and that each party considered himself owner of his separate property.
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The trial court did find and award the DefendantAppellant the reasonable value of his labors on the third
home owned by the parties in the amount of $2,100.00
(FINDINGS P. 1, March 2, 1979).

There was extensive testi-

mony and cross-examination regarding improvements to the
previous two homes.

Although much thereof was conflicting,

certain points were established that apparently caused the
trial court to find the Defendant-Appellant's claims to be
unpursuasive:
1.

The first home was bought and paid for by the

Plaintiff-Respondent prior to the marriage of the parties.
She made certain improvements including the enclosure of a
carport and the back porch, paying for both lumber, other
materials and labor (Tr. P43, LL15-25, P44, LLl-25).
2.

Improvements to the homes were testified to by

both parties, however, Defendant-Appellant was unable to
establish that he significantly contributed to the funding
of the improvements inasmuch as his income was limited to
social security (Tr. P202, LL21-23, P50, LL15-22).
3.

Plaintiff-Respondent funded all improvements

to the homes (Tr. PSO, LL23, 24, P49, LL12-25, PSO, LLl-14).
4.

The Defendant-Appellant was in his mid to late

seventies during the time and had not worked for at least
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five years and as such did not offer any specialized skill:
to the improvement of the yards of the three houses bey one,
that which was contributed by the Plaintiff-Respondent
(Tr. P201, LL4-25, LLl-6).
5.

The Plaintiff-Respondent assisted in the con-

struction of the improvements (Tr. P46, LL9-23) as well as
maintained the household activity which the DefendantAppellant admitted was of equal importance to his labor
(Tr. P209, LL15-25).
6.

The Defendant-Appellant was absent from the

homes a large portion of the time (Tr. Pl4, LL7-ll).

These

points together with the demeanor of the parties at trial
in the course of establishing their burdens of proof were
the apparent basis for the trial court to hold contrary to
the various theories and formulas now being placed before
the court by the Defendant-Appellant.
The Defendant-Appellant's computations are in
error for two reasons:

(1) they take into consideration

facts concerning labor on the Ruidoso and Roswell homes tha:
were apparently unpursuasive and unproven at trl. al, (2) the:
fail to take into consideration the fact proven at trial
that the improvements were funded by the Plaintiff Responoe·
out of her own separate funds

(see APPELLANT'S BRIEF P. !i

The Defendant-Appellant cites the case
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Lundgreen 112 Utah 31, 184 P.2d 670 (1947) in support of its
argument of improper distribution.

However, as in previous

cases cited, Lundgreen although somewhat similar, is based on
specific facts which are not present in the case before the
court.

In Lundgreen, the party claiming the value of its

labors was also able to establish that it contributed some of
the costs of the improvements and that

it did considerable

work to aid in improvement of the property to make the house
liveable.

In the current case, the Defendant-Appellant

never established any such contribution, but raised doubt in
such regard inasmuch as he traveled widely, was often absent,
and also used his own funds for gambling purposes.

To fund

construction improvement on less than $240.00 per month in
addition to financing his other activities would seem very
unlikely.

His testimony as to labor consisted only of general

yard work and such.
Another critical element in Lundgreen is that the
party claiming the value of her contributions established at
trial that it had entered into an agreement with the other
party whereby she would furnish the home if the other party
would purchase it.

In the present case there is no evidence

of such an agreement, in fact the first home was bought and
paid for some six months prior to the marriage.
It would seem that the more proper interpretation
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of Lundgreen would point to the argument that where a pani
is unable to establish at trial that it made financial contributions for improvements, or rendered considerable labor
and time in such improvements, and that the same was done
pursuant to an agreement related to the original procurement of the property, then the party asserting the interest
should not be entitled to the Lundgreen award of one-half
the market value in excess of the purchase price.

The

question then becomes one of "how much less than the Lundgrn:
award?"

The trial court in its discretion apparently chose

to draw the line at the last home and awarded the DefendantAppellant the value of his labors consistent with Lundgreen.
Finally, in response to the Defendant-Appellant's
claim that a gift was intended, the record speaks quite clear:
for itself.
life.

The parties were married in their later years of

They both had children and families of their own from

past marriages.

At trial the Plaintiff-Respondent clearly

stated that she at no time intended to make a one-half gift
of her life's savings and investments, including the real
estate to the Defendant-Appellant (Tr. Pll5, LLS-25).

She

did state that he placed considerable pressure upon her to.
put the property in joint tenancy (Tr. Pll5, LL8-24, Pll6,
LL6-13).

She stated that it had always been her intention
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to give the property to her family in the event of her death
(Tr. Pll6, LLl0-13).

The Defendant-Appellant clearly admitted

that he had no interest in the separate property

(See APPELLANT'S

BRIEF P. 17)

Although there may be some precedent outside this
jurisdiction which claims that the placing of property in
joint tenancy creates a gift of one-half between spouses, the
testimony referred to above tends to clearly rebut such a
presumption.

Incidentally, there also exists precedent in

foreign jurisdictions that hold that where title to property
purchased as a home by a husband was taken in the name of
himself and his wife as joint tenants, it was held that one
of the implied conditions of the gift to her was violated
when, about seven years later she abandoned her husband and
went to live with another man.

See Moore v. Moore 51 App.

D.C. 304, 278 Fed 1017 (1922).

Thus, marital misconduct may

well affect a gift in joint tenancy, should it be so construed, by one spouse to another.
There are assuredly numerous theories by which
division of property in divorce actions could be codified.
The Plaintiff-Respondent notes that the Defendant-Appellant
in his brief at trial also presented a "lien theory" and a
"title theory" for the consideration of the court.

The

Plaintiff-Respondent however points out that this jurisdiction
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has neither codified, nor set down any specific rules by wh1
property in divorce actions will be divided by the court
has not required that the mere designation of property hek
in "joint tenancy" suddenly creates some magical spousal uni
of ownership that is beyond the power of the court to award.
distribute or divide.

What the court has said in this regar

on many different occasions is perhaps most aptly re-stated
in its opinion in Weaver v. Weaver 21 Utah 2d, 442 P.2d 92i,
(1968);
The problem of a division of property between
parties to divorce proceedings has been before
this court on numerous occasions.
Section
30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, provides that when a
decree of divorce is made the court may make
such orders in relation to the property as
may be equitable.
The decisions of this court
have not announced a fixed rule or formula
for the division of property, but the rule
announced in practically all of the cases is
to the effect that the trial court has wide
discretion in these matters and the "ud ment
o the tria court wi
not e distur ed un ess
the record shows there has been an abuse of
discretion on the part of the court. (emphasis our:'
Accordingly, there is no requirement that the trial court
should have adopted the Defendant-Appellant's theories and
formulas, and from the trial court's judgment in the matter
it is clear that all such formulas and theories were rejecte:
Any findings as to intentions to make or not make gifts, the
effect of joint holdings, values of labor, funding of improv<
ments and such were all merged in the discretionary decisior.
\
\
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of the court.

To adopt any set rules, particularly with

respect to the Defendant-Appellant's gift theory would merely
further hamstring the courts in the already difficult task of
dividing property in divorce actions and the PlaintiffRespondent urges that the adoption of any such rule be avoided.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully submits that the
trial court's award of 77% to the Plaintiff-Respondent and
23% to the Defendant-Appellant of the marital estates was

proper and clearly within the discretion of the court.

The

Defendant-Appellant has faired to consider the certain factors
apparently taken into consideration by the trial court and
has thus based its appeal on assumptions that apparently were
not sufficiently proven at trial.
The court properly considered all the factors relating to the situation of the parties which included evidence
~:I

he

or.

of marital misconduct which as a practical matter may be used
in determining the division of property.
The Plaintiff-Respondent, during her years of marriage to the Defendant-Appellant suffered the depletion of her
entire savings and investments with the exception of one
mobile home in St. George, Utah.

It would only serve to

double her loss were the Defendant-Appellant, after living
far above his means at the expense of the Plaintiff-Respondent,
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and after having contributed very little in return, but exte:
sive heartache and grief, be able to use the courts to obta'.·
a substantial portion of the Plaintiff.Respondent's rerna~~
property.
Dated this 10th day of October, 1979.
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